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There are multiple accounts of scientific explanation on offer in philosophy of science, which variously 
locate explanatory power in fundamental processes, general laws, counterfactual dependencies, 
detailed causal mechanisms, unifying principles, simplified minimal models and more besides. Jacob and 
Monod’s operon model of gene regulation (1961) has, at one time or another, been used as an example 
in support of many of these accounts. How can one scientific case justifiably support such diverse views 
of explanation? This paper takes an historical approach to the question, which illuminates changing 
relations between philosophy and science. The results motivate, for our current context, a pluralist 
stance toward scientific explanation.  
 
Across the different philosophical accounts, the operon model itself is a constant. Based on many years 
of experiments in Escherichia coli, the model schematically represents relations between genetic and 
biochemical entities (structural genes, regulatory genes, DNA sequences, proteins, small molecules). 
These components and relations comprise a genetic regulatory switch, on’ or off’ depending on the 
presence or absence of small molecules in a cell’s environment. Briefly: a repressor protein specifically 
binds a region of DNA (a regulatory gene) located near a protein-encoding DNA sequence (one or more 
structural genes). The bound repressor prevents transcription of the nearby structural genes. A specific 
small molecule, however, can also bind the repressor, thereby preventing its binding to the regulatory 
gene. If this small molecule is present, then transcription of the structural genes proceeds. The 
structural genes encode enzymes needed to metabolize nutrients associated with the inducing small 
molecules, completing the regulatory circuit. 
 
All agree on the basics of this simple model. Similarly uncontroversial is the claim that the operon model 
explains (in some sense of the term) regulation of gene expression. But further analysis of this claim runs 
the full gamut of philosophical views on biological explanation. The operon model has been interpreted 
as an instance of DN explanation (Schaffner 1969), a step toward reduction of biological phenomena to 
physical and chemical laws (Schaffner 1974, Kimbrough 1979), an “interfield theory” linking genetics and 
biochemistry (Darden and Maull 1977), an example of anti-reductionism for 
Mendelian and molecular genetics (Kitcher 1984), an illustration of highly abstract models of gene 
regulatory networks (Richardson 1996), one of a heterogeneous collection of theories or mechanisms 
required to “cover the domain” in the absence of biological laws (Beatty 1997), an example of 
mechanistic explanation supporting interventionism over causal process theories (Woodward 2002, 
Craver 2007), an example of an abstract model that contradicts the basic mechanistic view (Levy and 
Bechtel 2013), and an example satisfying general principles of biological organization (Bich et al 2015). 
This compendium of uses suggests that the operon model is a mirror in which philosophers see what 
they want to see, illustrating explanation by more fundamental laws, by description of causal 
mechanisms, by abstraction, or by general principles, depending on who is looking. How can one 
scientific case justifiably support such a range of views about explanation? What does this one-many’ 
relationship tell us about the relation between science and philosophy, and the status of any one 
philosophical account of explanation? 
 
The most incisive way to answer these questions, I propose, is to take a historical approach. Considered 
as a trajectory through conceptual space over time, the uses of the operon model reflect not only the 
philosophical preoccupations of particular intellectual contexts (reduction, laws of nature, mechanisms, 
computational modeling) but also features of the relation between science and philosophy. 
This approach yields several interesting results. For one, it indicates that rejection of the traditional 
association of explanation and theory-reduction was the upshot of careful critical reflection. No other 
explanatory accounts of the operon have been decisively rebutted in this way. The historical approach 
also highlights a key shift in relations between science and philosophy. As philosophers of biology were 
reaching an anti-reductionist consensus in the 1980s, biologists were extolling the virtues of reductionist 
approaches. That is, what came to be the prevailing philosophical view tacked against dominant 
scientific ideas of the time. This oppositional tendency is no longer in evidence by the turn of the 
millennium. Recent uses of the operon model are closely aligned with the prevailing views of particular 
fields of biology. 
 
These two points lead to a third, which is the main focus of this paper. The traditional reductionist 
account excepted (for reasons noted above), the operon model supports diverse accounts of scientific 
explanation: causal mechanisms, interventionism, multilevel systems models, and more. Supporters of 
each can make a good case for their favored account of explanation. The operon model can be 
construed as a basic mechanism of gene regulation, grounded in experimental successes of molecular 
biology. 
 
Its relations include specific causal processes and a wide variety of difference-making relations, which 
afford fine-grained prediction and control over systems to which it applies. The model can also be 
construed as an abstract circuit, a regulatory genetic motif, or a multilevel systems model. Each of these 
accounts focuses on a single aspect of the operon model, identifying it as the source of explanatory 
power. Each can appeal to norms and standards of explanation in particular fields of life science: 
molecular biology, biomedicine, or systems biology. Taken together, these diverse philosophical 
uses of the operon model support pluralism about scientific explanation. 
 
Moreover, the operon model’s interpretive inclusivity is, in our current intellectual environment, an 
explanatory virtue. It is a familiar point that science is increasingly interdisciplinary perhaps unavoidably, 
with increasing specialization and accelerating technological change. So, going forward, more and more 
significant scientific explanations will require contributions from multiple fields and disciplines. In such a 
context, a model supporting different styles of explanation is a valuable resource - a versatile point of 
contact between fields with diverse explanatory aims and commitments. The view of the operon model 
that emerges from considering its philosophical uses in historical perspective, is well-suited to our 
current interdisciplinary context. Monism about scientific explanation is an artifact of a limited, 
ahistorical approach. This is, at least, what the operon case suggests. 
 
